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On a radical democratic theory of political protest:
potentials and shortcomings
Christian Volk
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Arbeitsbereich Politik und Recht, Freie Universität
Berlin, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
The increasing number of protest activities urges political and social philoso-
phers to analyze the meaning and function of protest in modern democracy.
Its focus on con!ictive social relations makes radical democratic theory the
most promising approach currently at hand for such an endeavor. It allows us
to comprehend today's form of protest as a critique of the current shape of
modern democratic order (and not as interest politics or as a struggle for
rights). Accordingly, radical democratic theory has established itself in aca-
demic discourses and is widely and well received by political activists.
Notwithstanding its critical potential, I argue that radical democratic thought
is not in a position to conceptually grasp the di!erentia speci"ca of
a democratic order and to su"ciently determine the meaning of protest for
democracy. A democratic and social theory of political protest in modern
democracies is, therefore, still waiting to be developed.
KEYWORDS Political protest; constitutionalism; radical democratic theory; social movements;
depoliticization
Introduction
For several decades, ‘depoliticization’ and ‘post-democracy’ have been pro-
minent terms used to portray the state of modern Western democracies. In
recent years though, new forms of political protest seem to bear witness to
an increased politicization. Its spectrum ranges from anti-austerity protests
in Madrid or New York to digital protest (in the form of leaking, hacktivism
or virtual sit-ins), refugee protests (such as in Calais) to right-wing protest
against an alleged Islamization of Europe (e.g. PEGIDA in Germany). And
whenever G8, G20, or multilateral economic organizations meet, transna-
tional protest emerges, for which place names such as Seattle, Genoa or
Hamburg have become ciphers. The theoretical inquiry into the relationship
between political protest and the state of modern Western democracies will
be the subject of my paper. For the increasing number of protest activities
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on the one hand and di#erent ‘dis$gurations’ (Urbinati, 2014) of democracy,
from populism to new forms of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy, on
the other urge political and social philosophers to analyze the meaning and
function of protest in modern democracy.
One theoretical approach that is particularly well suited to this endeavor,
which has established itself in academic discourses and is also widely
received by political activists, is radical democracy theory. It is, therefore,
the aim of my subsequent deliberations to work out the potential and
de$cits of radical democratic theorization of political protest. Radical demo-
cratic theory allows us to comprehend today’s form of protest as a critique
of the current shape of modern democratic order (and not as interest
politics or a struggle for rights). Its focus on con!ictive social relations
makes it the most promising approach for the theorization of political
protest currently at hand. Notwithstanding this potential, however, I argue
that radical democratic theory is not in a position to conceptually grasp the
di!erentia speci"ca of a democratic order – especially in contrast to other
political order formations – and to su"ciently determine the meaning of
political protest for democracy. A democratic and social theory of political
protest in modern democracies is still waiting to be developed.
Other theoretical approaches, such as a (liberal) rights-based approach
partly engage with complexities of protest today, but their juridical observa-
tion scheme narrows protest down to a ‘struggle . . . for rights’ (Colliot-Th
élène, 2011, p. 208). For them, the political signi$cance of today’s protest
movements is to secure acquired rights, to extend the circle of bene$ciaries
and/or to advance rights ‘in new and unexpected ways’ (Lang, 2017, p. 30).1
In contrast, the $ndings of protest and social movement research reveal that
much of this protest is not $rst and foremost concerned with claiming or
extending or ensuring rights. Many recent political protest movements aim
at radical political change (i.e. also changing the notion of how political
change can be accomplished), right up to the revolutionizing of the social,
political, and economic order, and the establishment of alternative social life
forms (Della Porta, 2015).2 One might not agree with the content of this
fundamental critique. However, radical democratic thought provides
a vocabulary to better comprehend the political meaning and signi$cance
of these collective practices of (confrontational) contestation, its new orga-
nizational forms and the identity construction of many of these new protest
movements (see Bassett, 2014; Lorey, 2014).
In the following, I will argue, therefore, that the theory of radical democ-
racy must be considered as a conceptual advancement of democratic theory
since it can help us a good deal to capture some speci$cs of today’s protest
and is therefore preferable to other approaches to interpreting political
protest. However, the problem with radical democratic theory in determin-
ing the function and meaning of political protest in modern democracies is
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that it lacks a sense as to what extent the elements of order in modern
democracies (courts, rights, institutions etc.) enable and shape the practices
of protest. As a result, the normative implications arising from this for an
understanding of democracy and democratic order just as much as of
protest itself remain opaque.
My thesis consists of two parts, appreciation and criticism, and the
structure of my argumentation also re!ects this division. In the $rst part,
I argue that despite their fundamental theoretical di#erences,3 authors such
as Jacques Rancière, Chantal Mou#e, Ernesto Laclau, Sheldon Wolin and
Slavoj !i"ek have paved the way to a new and di#erent interpretation of
‘public, collective actions of non-state bodies, which express objection or
criticism, and which are connected to the formulation of a social or political
concern’ (Rucht & Neidhardt, 2007, p. 631). These innovations have helped
democratic theory enlarge and re$ne its conceptual apparatus. By working
out the central components of radical democratic theory, I show how
protest in modern democracies can be perceived as a combined critique
of the suspension of political practice and participation , as a critique of the
cementing of political inequality, and as a critique of juridi$cation, the
jargon of functionalism and necessity in political a#airs. In the second
part, I shall point out the limits of radical democratic theory’s terminological
and conceptual apparatus to cope with the complex undertaking of thinking
through the relationship between protest and modern democracy. This is
mainly due to two basic theoretical premises of radical democratic thinking.
The $rst is that both the possibility and the notion of rational processes of
understanding in society as a whole have been eradicated from this demo-
cratic theory . Its second premise is that democracy has only one form of
temporality, the fugitive moment.
Radical democracy as a critique of depoliticization
Although I cannot fully do justice to the complexity of radical democratic
thought, its vocabulary and analytical perspective can be used to theorize
political protest in a new and illuminating way. To this end, I must work out
the components that demarcate the theoretical core of radical democratic
theory. Those components are shared by the aforementioned thinkers and
justify assigning them to one side in the $eld of democratic theory, despite
their di#erences in detail. Essentially, these are the commitment to con!ic-
tive political action, the assumption of the ‘ineradicability of antagonism’
(Mou#e, 2005, p. 3) and the analysis of collective, political identities. A closer
look at these three theoretical components will provide insights into protest
as a key concept in radical democratic thought. From this perspective, the
experience of political participation, communality and solidarity marks an
inherent element of political protesting. Furthermore, this perspective can
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be used to demonstrate that protest can be understood as a political
practice that challenges and seeks to overcome existing patterns of inequal-
ity. Finally, a radical democratic perspective can help to reveal how the
political agenda of protest movements can be understood as a contribution
to a counter-hegemonic discourse, exposing political alternatives and the
contingency of political decisions.
One possible objection to this radical democratic account might lament
that it idealizes political protest and is driven by revolutionary romanticism.
I shall address this in detail, but instead of too hastily dispelling the account
completely, I would like to propose a revision that allows us to understand it
as a fruitful contribution to a critical analysis of patterns of depoliticization in
modern democracies.
In the following three subsections, Iwork in a threefoldmanner. First, I consider
each theoretical component and specify its de$ning features. Second,
I demonstrate how each aspect leads to a unique interpretation of political
protest and protest practices. And third, I illustrate how each account of protest
can be used to analyze patterns of depoliticization in modern democracies.
Con!ictive political action and the experience of political action
Political action is at the heart of radical democratic thought. However, to
properly understand this $rst theoretical aspect, the favored ‘mode’ of political
action has to be speci$ed. According to many radical democratic thinkers, real
or true democratic action is not consensus-oriented but rather aimed against
something. ‘Real’ politics contains a rebellious moment with revolutionary and
destructive elements (see, Wolin, 1994, p. 23 or Balibar, 2014, p. 284), as
suggested, for example, by Etienne Balibar’s phrase of ‘democracy by resis-
tance’ (2013) or Miguel Abensour’s (2012) idea of rebellious democracy. Thus,
radical democratic thought understands the ‘essence of “the political”’ (Mou#e,
2005, p. 8) or the ‘essence of politics’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 38) as acting against
something or someone, in struggle and con!ict.
This claim is founded on the conviction that every political order is based on
the exclusion and suppression of political alternatives (Mou#e, 2005, p. 18). These
‘other suppressed possibilities’ are exposed and reactivated by acting against
those who represent the political order. This is the $rst important meaning that
radical democratic thought ascribes to political protest: Acts of protest can be
considered to be acts of liberation – partially at least. The possibility of organizing
the world and regulating political issues in a di#erent way is publicly claimed,
against the parameters of a dominant ‘existing constellation’ (!i"ek, 2000, pp. 37
and 199). But these acts are not the acts of individuals. Political protest is
a collective political practice where many individuals are involved. A multitude
of political arenas are established, and people experience moments of commun-
ality and solidarity (Brown, 2015, p. 219). Toput itmorepertinently, in the tradition
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of Hannah Arendt, this is what may even be called the experience of political
freedom. In this context, the second meaning of protest in radical democratic
thought can be identi$ed. Most of the time, political decision-making takes place
in the established channels of liberal democracies. But in rare, ‘fugitive moments’
when this order gets disrupted, ‘individuals from the excluded social strata take
on responsibilities, deliberate about goals and choices, and share in decisions that
have broad consequences and a#ect unknown and distant others’ (Wolin, 1994,
p. 18). !i"ek, too, emphasizes these ‘moments of democratic enthusiasm,’ inher-
ent in political mobilizations, in which we should ‘locate the crucial dimension (of
the revolutions in Eastern Europe)’ that was ‘obfuscated by later renormalization’
(!i"ek 2000, p. 206).
Depoliticization I: the suspension of political practice and participation
The $rst step in updating this radical democratic account is to read the
experience of political action as a criticism of how politics occurs in modern
democracies. One feature of this is the outsourcing of political decision-
making to independent, quasi-public and/or private regimes. Politics is
transformed into administration, and political disputes are treated as if
they are issues that can be dealt with by experts and experienced ministerial
civil servants in a calm and deliberate manner. Radical democratic thought
criticizes these depoliticizing tendencies within modern democracies, claim-
ing that there can be no democracy on the basis of the suspension of
political participation. Political con!icts must be made publicly visible,
exposing relationships of domination and exclusion that have merely been
declared as being democratic.
Furthermore, these considerations highlight the massive in!uence of
depoliticization on the political culture of modern democracies, especially
with regard to the withdrawal of broad classes of mainly young people from
the political system (see, for example, Henn & Foard, 2014, p. 361 but also
Grasso, 2018). And as empirical studies show, there is a signi$cant propor-
tion of non-voters among those political activists and demonstrators who
reject the existing democratic regime because they perceive it as ‘alienating,
uninterested in the issues which motivate them to behave politically, and
unresponsive’ (Hay, 2007, p. 26). Many young activists see political protest as
a way of bypassing conventional channels of political engagement and not
as a struggle for rights. In this manner, radical democratic thought can help
us focus on a relationship that falls through the analytical grid of liberal
democratic theory: the dialectic of political disa#ection and (confrontational)
political protest.
Political disa#ection, usually noticeable by sinking voter turnout or
a decline in the members of established parties, is traditionally explained
by the (changed) interests, values and personality pro$le of an individual
of modern capitalist society (Putnam, 2000, pp. 183–286). Radical
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democratic thought, however, encourages us to draw a di#erent picture
of the culture of political participation. Here, non-participation in the
established forms of political involvement (elections, party work, etc.) is
interpreted as a form of politics (Hay, 2007, p. 26 but also Flinders, 2012).
Disa#ection, cynicism and mistrust are ‘the outcome of institutional prac-
tices’ (O#e, 2006, p. 23) and animate people to search for alternative
forms of political engagement that can redeem the promise of
a participatory moment in politics (Buchstein & Jörke, 2003, p. 488) –
and do not necessarily lead to political apathy as the approval $gures for
old (UKIP, FPÖ) and new (AfD, M5S) protest parties as well as right-wing
(PEGIDA, Alt-right movement) or left-wing (Occupy, Indignados) protest
movements reveal.
Radical democratic criticism thus provokes an alternative account of why
established forms of political participation and decision-making in modern
democracies face a deep crisis of authority. The problem diagnosis here is
that these forms of political decision-making – to turn a quote by Walter
Benjamin on its head – allow people at most to receive their rights, but they
deprive them of the possibility to express themselves politically (Benjamin,
1981, p. 42). !i"ek refers illustratively to this forced disappearance of the
expressive dimension of politics. The reason, according to !i"ek, why ‘protes-
tors often feel somehow deceived when those in power against whom their
protest was addressed simply accept their demand’, can be found in the fact
that while the content of protest is realized, the expressiveness as such is not
included in the political realignment (!i"ek, 2000, p. 204). Thus, the demonstra-
tors gain their rights but stay deprived of their – direct or symbolic – expression.
The demand for the consolidation of (the possibility of) the experience of
political freedom remains unful$lled.
Radical democratic analysis draws attention to aspects of modern politics that
ignore expressive and creative elements of political exchange and the desire for
them, o#ering in return ‘atomized forms of citizenship’ (Stoker, 2006, p. 11); they
point to political rhetoric, language games and political programs that no longer
know the politically interested, engaged and active citizen. Here, the advertising
campaigns of political parties can be called to mind. They imitate the marketing
strategies of the private sector and claim in ‘simplistic terms thatwe can have it all
at no cost’ (Stoker, 2006, p. 2). Furthermore, these de$cits are visible in public
con!icts in the media, which favor the gesture but su#er from a lack of space for
appealing substantial analysis (Meyer & Hinchman, 2002).
Ineradicability of antagonism and the struggle for political equality
Authors like Mou#e, Rancière, Balibar or !i"ek share the conviction of ‘the
impossibility of a fully inclusive “rational” consensus’ (Mou#e, 2005, p. 11) in
politics. Moreover, a related sentiment conceives of the ‘pluralistic nature of
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the world of the social,’ where con!icts exist ‘for which there can never be
a rationalistic solution’ (Mou#e, 2005, p. 10). What radical democratic thin-
kers derive from this (some inspired by Carl Schmitt’s work), is the assump-
tion of the ‘ineradicable character of antagonism’ within the social and
political life of modern societies. This is the second component which
many radical democratic thinkers have in common. From the perspective
of radical democratic thought, there is consensus in modern societies, but
this consensus is not rational in the Habermasian sense. Instead, consensus
is always an expression of hegemony and inequality. Thus, consensus is not
the aim but rather ‘the non-existence of politics’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 43).
Politics, in contrast, is the genuine form of expressing dissent (Rancière,
2010, p. 38). Any true political con!ict questions ‘the normal state of
things’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 43) and, therefore, is marked by a very speci$c
‘discursive structure’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 52), which Rancière calls ‘dis-
agreement’ (La mésentente). Dis-agreement as the discursive structure of
real political con!icts is of such kind that the political elite and the ruling
parties do not acknowledge those political agents who question the status
quo as legitimate political agents. Rather, these groups, movements, acti-
vists, etc. are labeled as ‘dreamers,’ ‘extremists,’ ‘incorrigibles,’ ‘hooligans’
and so on who just make irrational ‘noise’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 52). Their
status as agents is depoliticized, and their concerns are dismissed as being
unworkable, utopian, exaggerated or radical. By questioning the status quo
and criticizing the behavior of the ruling political elite, they are portrayed
as having seemingly departed from a ‘common world of reason and
argument’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 53). This retaliation is reason enough not
to engage with the political elite and discuss con!icting views – both sides
see themselves as being in a ‘noncommunity’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 53).
Depoliticization II: the cementing of political inequality
What kind of conclusions can we draw from this second component of
radical democratic thought for our re-reading of political protest? Political
protest can be understood as a practice that contests the existing de$nition
of who is regarded as a ‘legitimate political speaker’. With a myriad of
di#erent, sometimes fancy, sometimes outlandish, practices of protest, acti-
vists seek to rede$ne when, where, how and who may legitimately speak
within a political con!ict (for a profound empirical analysis of the women’s
movement see Weldon, 2011). In doing so, the protesters enthrone them-
selves as new political co-speakers. They can disclose the degree of exclu-
sion inherent in the everyday political procedures of modern democracies,
in a new unforeseen way. The democratic-theoretical critique, departing
from such a reading of political equality, is closely linked with the above-
addressed lack of political experience-making (Balibar, 2004, p. 311). Yet,
there the critique is focused on the established forms of politics which deny
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 7
the experience of communality and solidarity. Here, the criticism is directed
toward the existing patterns of political inequality.
These patterns of political inequality in modern democracies are multi-
farious. Modern democracies maintain a capitalistic socio-economic basic
structure that leads to unequal education opportunities, precariousness,
isolation and social alienation in all, but especially in the lower social strata –
with the e#ect that people do not raise their voices (Schäfer, 2012). Besides
this socio-economic form of inequality, modern democracies bring forth
political inequalities in terms of the disparate representation of interests
and groups in the context of public political will-formation. This form of
inequality is not so much based on socio-economic factors but on social
di#erences with regard to the organizational capacity of political interests
(Olson, 1971), their ability to become a political issue (Thaa, 2016), to sustain
a con!ict (O#e, 1969) as well as their argumentative and justi$catory power
(Nullmeier, 2000). All this contributes to a situation of the incongruence of
the author and addressee of political decision and generates a feeling of
being dominated, which provokes protests in return.
Political protest interrupts this order and its existing patterns of inequality
for a ‘fugitive moment’. From a radical democratic perspective, protest,
therefore, is the genuine practice of politics. For it does not only challenge
the existing balance of power and may seek to establish ‘a new hegemony’
(Mou#e, 2005, p. 52), but it is precisely the form in which ‘those who have
no part’ claim their ‘part’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 9) and realize the ‘sole principle’
of politics: equality (Rancière, 1999, p. 31). From a radical democratic per-
spective, protest is the equality-realization-activity.
However, such a perspective on the relationship between protest and
order has two crucial implications for the concept of political protest. First,
one can only speak of political protest in terms of true politics when
a political actor (group, movement, etc.) articulates a fundamental contra-
diction with the established political order. What quali$es as a fundamental
contradiction, however, remains vague and opaque. Is a signature campaign
against the construction of wind turbines in one’s own neighborhood, so-
called ‘Not-in-my-back-yard-initiatives’, true political protest? Is the publicly
expressed protest of !ights attendants for better wages real protest or just
a ‘harmless ritual’ (Marcuse, 1970, p. 89)? The fact that such questions arise
was demonstrated by the debate about the French student protest, Nuit
debout, which some radical democrats have denied the status of true protest
since it did not include those who are really dominated: the underclass
(Lagasnerie, 2016).4 Second, confrontational, disruptive and riotous forms of
protest in modern democracies are being re-evaluated and seen as political
practices that are not necessarily beyond the boundaries of what is compa-
tible with the idea of democracy. For it is precisely these forms of protest
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that express the fundamental contradiction and symbolically break with the
established order. However, the limits of confrontation remain unclear.
Political identity, collectivity and counter-hegemonic discourse
Radical democrats share the assumption that politics is a battleground of
socially and politically produced (not pre-political) ‘collective identities’
(Mou#e, 2005, p. 11). They conclude that the key question of politics is
not extending or ensuring individual rights, as is the case in the liberal
tradition, but rather to analyze the type of power relationship between these
social groups, classes or collective identities within society. In return, radical
democratic thinkers are convinced that a political movement can be formed
only when there is a ‘constitutive outside’, a ‘they’ that is confronted by an
‘us’ (Mou#e, 2005, p. 15). This ‘they’ can take on di#erent concrete forms. In
radical democratic thinking, however, reference is made to the system of
rule and its representatives who produce otherness through criminalization,
racial segregation,5 precariousness, exploitation, discourse on normality and
so on. Ideally, a collective political identity forms against this type of nega-
tion and non-acknowledgment, emerging as a political ‘identity’ that pre-
sents a di#erent, con!icting view of the political, social and economic
situation. This opposing account of the status quo enables the unmasking
of existing laws as both non-neutral but also as stabilizing of a speci$c order
of domination (Wolin, 1994, p. 24).
Depoliticization III: necessity, functionalism and juridi!cation
By highlighting the context of political group-forming and narration
(Rancière, 2012) as central components of (real) dispute, radical democratic
thought opposes two dominant depoliticization practices of modern orders:
the juridi$cation of political and social life and the dominance of function-
alism. While juridi$cation undermines the foundations for the formation of
collective identities, functionalism discredits alternative and critical por-
trayals of the political and socio-economic status quo.
Juridi!cation
The formation of a collective political identity is the prerequisite for reveal-
ing and contesting the hegemonic character of modern democratic order.
From the perspective of radical democratic thinking, law and the juridi$ca-
tion of social and political coexistence undermines this prerequisite. The rule
by law suggests that the formation of a politically powerful ‘we’ is not
necessary at all. The con!ict, translated into law, can now be decided in
the interest of all citizens as members of the legal community and inte-
grated into the existing order as the ‘reigning idyll’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 102)
or, polemically speaking, the ‘harmony of justice’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 63).
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Besides, the legal system always translates social and political con!icts into
collisions between the fundamental rights of an individual and other legal
interests (mostly the fundamental rights claims of others). Neither the
political movement nor its political concerns are negotiated by the legal
system (courts, system of norms). In court, there is usually only one indivi-
dual who has to prove that he/she has been violated in one of his/her
fundamental rights in order to be heard at all. This triggers isolation in
a $eld that is politically disputed and it undermines the potential for political
mobilization. Moreover, this obscures the social and political con!ict situa-
tion by pretending to pacify con!icting interests by means of the legal
system. Accordingly, Rancière argues that juridi$cation and rule by law is
‘not so much the submission of the legislative and the executive to the
“government of the Bench”’ as a declaration of ‘no case to answer’ for any
public manifestation of con!ict’(Rancière, 1999, p. 109).
Contrary to the trend toward depoliticization by juridi$cation, political
protest movements bring the dispute to the streets and publicly uncover
existing social, economic and political injustices that are also secured or
brought into force by law.
Functionalism as depoliticization
As a strategy of depoliticization, functionalism secures the status quo, sets
formal criteria and acts both as a $lter and supplier for useful political
solutions. Functionalism depoliticizes by drastically reducing the number
of alternatives and dismissing numerous political programs as useless and
non-functional. Speci$cally, this means that the ‘global capitalistic constella-
tion’ (!i"ek, 2000, p. 199) is ineluctable. One consequence of this is that
instead of a publicly visible dispute about (socio-economic, political and
ecological) alternatives, economic necessities (that cannot be ignored) take
the forefront. A managerial logic prevails in public debates, and central
questions of the future are removed from political negotiations (Hay, 2007,
p. 86). In most cases, this is done by delegating the relevant issues to expert
commissions, standard setting agencies or the transnational cooperation of
authorities, such as International Organization of Securities Commissions or
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. These forms of expertocracy
and technocracy transform disputes about political alternatives into discus-
sions about questions of knowledge and insight.
In opposition to these dominant discourse formations, protest argues
that ‘another world is possible’. This may sound like political romanticism.
However, it is crucial to recognize that from a radical democratic theory
perspective protest movements strive to change ‘the parameters of what is
considered “possible” in the existing constellation’ (!i"ek, 2000, p. 199).
Alternative accounts of the status quo and the counter-expertise generated
in the course of protest formation challenge the epistemological basic
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structure of dominant discourses and, in doing so, establish a counter-
hegemonic one. This counter-hegemonic discourse fundamentally disputes
everything that has been hitherto portrayed as an important political pro-
blem, and problematizes the discursive and material construction of the
problem itself. By establishing new and di#erent patterns of thought and
cognitive frames, protest movements seek to overcome an ‘increasingly
narrow range of policy spectrum’ (Hay, 2007, p. 56). At the same time, the
protest stresses the man-made character of the political constellation and
the possibility of arranging things di#erently. In doing so, protest sheds light
on a crucial, often forgotten character of social and political life, namely its
contingency.
Con!ict and order – the two blind spots of radical democratic
thought
Radical democratic thought emphasizes that there is no democracy without
an active, rebellious citizenry as well as creative, strong protest movements.
Bureaucratization, the juridi$cation of politics, the change of form of parties
and political institutions have contributed to the disappointment of the
citizens about the political everyday life. One consequence is political
apathy among broad social strata; the other consequence is the search for
new forms of political expression beyond established channels. The latter
insight is the result of updating the central components of radical demo-
cratic thought. This perspective allows us to interpret protest as a struggle
for experiencing political action (i.e. its creative power, its communality and
solidarity), for rede$ning when, where, how and who may legitimately speak
in matters of politics, and for establishing a counter-hegemonic discourse.
Additionally, it helps to uncover the di#erent strategies and patterns of
depoliticization that are operating in modern democracies. Radical demo-
cratic thought expands the analytical spectrum of democratic theory, both
as a tool to analyze the depoliticization patterns of modern orders and as
a vocabulary to decipher current political protest movements.
Notwithstanding these achievements, key questions about the relation-
ship between protest and democracy remain unresolved, both analytically
and normatively. In my $rst criticism, I argue that radical-democratic think-
ing overemphasizes one central element of democracy, namely the mani-
festation of con!ict, and falls short in properly grasping the second central
element in conceptual terms, namely the postulate of understanding
between political opponents. Therefore, radical democratic theory interprets
the idea of democracy too one-sidedly. Three major problems arise from this
for theorizing protest: on the one hand, radical democratic thinking fails to
identify the degree and speci$city of political responsibility that protest
movements bear in a democracy. This responsibility certainly di#ers from
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that of political decision-makers and parties. Nevertheless, even protest
movements have a responsibility not to make democratic-political disputes
impossible. However, there is a lack of criteria in radical democratic thought
to distinguish between progressive and regressive forms of political protest.
On the other hand, radical democratic theory tends to internalize the
political. Politics transforms into a question of faith, where discussion and
good reasons seem to play a minor role – or only a purely instrumental
one.6 And thirdly, political activism may be jeopardized by too carelessly
and uncritically drawing on radical democratic thought to interpret the
present. By overemphasizing the need for confrontation, the engagement
with dissenting opinions threatens to degenerate into a mere ritual of self-
reassurance and self-stabilization, and the emancipatory political practices
within movements are endangered.
My second criticism is that radical democratic thought is not capable of
theoretically grasping and naming what political protest owes to the ele-
ments of order in a modern democracy. This de$cit becomes apparent when
law and political order are perceived primarily as a limitation, a moment of
domination or hegemony. In contrast to this, I will show that in modern
democracies, law also opens up and secures an ‘enabling space’ (Volk, 2015,
p. 234) for political protest. The knowledge of and experience with this right
to protest as a core component of democracy as a form of social life can also
be found in the practices of protest. However, radical democratic thinking
loses sight of this, since it su#ers from a temporal bias and reduces demo-
cratic politics to the fugitive moment of intervention.
Is democracy just con!ict?
Protest without limits?
Radical democratic thinking has to master a balancing act. On the one hand, it
emphasizes con!ict, struggle and confrontation as the ‘essence’ or ‘principle’ of
politics, with political protest as the genuine form of politics. On the other hand,
its authors stress the necessity for a ‘common bond’ (Mou#e, 2005, p. 20) or
a ‘shared “common”’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 36) over and above the trenches of
con!ict. The problem that arises is to ‘transform equality in war [. . .]’ that exists
in the moment of riots, street battles or general strikes ‘[. . .] into political
freedom’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 13). Or by posing the question as to ‘how the
dimension of antagonism can be “tamed”, thanks to the establishment of
institutions and practices, through which the potential antagonism can be
played out in an agonistic way’ (Mou#e, 2005, pp. 20–21).
If we take a closer look at who or what seems to endanger or prevent the
transformation of antagonism into agonistic politics, then radical democratic
thinking refers exclusively to the shortcomings of the political and legal order.
Accordingly, they warn against a lack of ‘agonistic legitimate political channels
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for dissenting voices’ (Mou#e, 2005, p. 21) and a political order that shields itself
from ‘all the breaking and entering perpetrated by egalitarian logic’ and
stubbornly adheres to ‘its natural logic’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 31). Wherever
there is no institutional opening for alternative ideas, where no political parti-
cipation is safeguarded, where demonstrations are forbidden, the press is
maybe censored, or criticism is criminalized, the con!ict threatens to escalate.
In this context, Slavoj !i"ek speaks of the transformation of political con!icts
into ‘ultra-politics’ (!i"ek, 2000, p. 190). He describes ultra-politics as the
attempt to ‘to depoliticize the con!ict by heightening it to its extreme [. . .]’.
In the worst case, protest groups then become paramilitary units, terror cells or
terrorist organizations. In this manner, politics become reformulated into ‘[. . .]
a war between “Us” and “Them”, our Enemy’ (!i"ek, 2000, p. 190). In order to
prevent this, institutions must be created that allow for agonistic public sphere
and a politics of contestation (Wingenbach, 2011, p. 93).
At $rst glance, this explanatory approach may sound plausible and it
probably goes some way in explaining protest, particularly for cases in
autocratic regimes. However, for democratic orders, it is plausible only to
a certain degree because political rights are guaranteed there to di#erent
extents and at di#erent levels, that allow and enable dissent, contestation
and so on. If we consider the most recent forms of escalation of political
con!icts – such as the shooting of steel bullets at police forces in Hamburg
during the protests against the last G-20 summit,7 the series of arson attacks
on refugee shelters or even political assassinations – it seems to be insu"-
cient to explain the relapse into antagonism simply by pointing to ossi$ed
political institutions.
An ‘agonistic democracy’ (Wenman, 2013) can also be made impossible
by radicalized ideologies and identities. When activists are convinced to be
in a battle against ‘in$dels’, or if political opponents are called ‘betrayers of
the people’, and refugees are labeled as ‘hostile invaders’, there is a danger
that one will quickly run out of political alternatives and the use of violence
will appear to be an ultima ratio. This con$guration of political discourse
follows Schmitt’s friend–enemy distinction, according to which political
confrontations are not concerned with compromise, a joint shaping of the
present, or con!ictive coexistence but rather aim ‘to preserve one’s own
form of existence’ (Schmitt, 2007 [1932], p. 27), which is now threatened
with negation due to the otherness of the (supposedly) foreign (migrants,
Islam) or the internal enemy (‘leftwing lying press’, multicultural cosmopo-
litan utopians). The consequence is a climate of enmity within the demo-
cratic-political public sphere. Here, however, the radical collective identity
has become a consequence of an extreme world view and thus leads to the
disappearance of alternatives – and not the other way around.
This perspective on the problem of ultra-politics has consequences for
the conceptual development of a democratic theory. If the vantage point of
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radical democratic thought is indeed the transformation from antagonism to
agonistic politics, then it must also take a critical position toward the emer-
gence, form and content of political protest movements. Theoretical thinking
must not be content with criticizing the structure and institutions of the
political order. Instead, it must also engage in a critical analysis of organiza-
tional form, contestation practices, identity formation (diagnostic, prognos-
tic, etc.) and frames of protest movements, indicating which ways of identity
formation may endanger the democratic struggle. This is missing in radical
democratic theories so far. Within the framework of the theory, radical
democratic thinking neglects to clarify the question of what political respon-
sibility political protest movements may have, in order to not make the
democratic dispute impossible for their part (which is not the same as
publicly demanding them from these movements as well). The rise of right-
wing populism and religious fundamentalist protest movements underline
the importance and urgency of clarifying this question and re!ecting on
what distinguishes emancipatory forms of protest from regressive forms.
The internalization of the political and the threat of self-immunization
This de$ciency, however, is not caused by chance: it has theoretical and
conceptual reasons. Radical democratic thinking has more or less given up
the democratic postulate that one should exchange and discuss with the
political opponent, and therefore no longer insists on adherence to the
postulate on the level of theory.
The reason why radical democratic theory has abandoned this postulate
is directly related to the fact that large parts of the authors are convinced
that agreement in the realm of politics is ‘more a sort of conversion than
a process of rational persuasion’ (Mou#e, 2000, p. 102). The theoretical
consequences of such a conviction are far-reaching in the sense that they
turn politics into a question of faith, a question of one’s inner attitude: Are
you for us or against us? This internalization of the political leads, strangely,
to disdain for serious political debate, dispute and controversy that was
once the starting point – for what should one seriously argue about if
everything is a matter of belief? Other people do not need to be convinced,
but rather must convert. In the worst case, the other fraction or the other
person do not simply support a political position which I do not share, but is
even internally corrupted. Radical democratic thought thus contains
a theory building block that $nally undermines the conditions of the possi-
bility to realize their own normative postulates for the society as a whole,
such as the experience of political participation or equality.
Considering the fact that many activists and protest movements today
receive, adapt and relate radical democratic thinking to their own needs for
action (see, e.g. Douzinas, 2016; White, 2016), the theoretical inconsistency
takes on a newdimension. For activist political practice, this theoretical building
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block of radical democratic thinking – this internalization of the political and
the rejection of discourse and debate with the political opponent – could be
problematic inasmuch as it might encourage the formation of political entities
with $xed and hardened identities that have nothing to say to each other. The
confrontation is then trans$gured as the only moment of the movement and
communication-oriented interaction with political opponents is no longer part
of the political repertoire. The danger then is that the protest movement may
sooner or later lose a good part of its emancipatory content. For what reason?
Without exchange, confusion and discomfort, discursive practices within the
protest movement tend to develop and cement an absolute opposition to the
political establishment. Agonism threatens to become a friend-foe relationship.
It undermines the re!exive democratic practiceswithin protestmovements; the
discussion and debate turns into applied ideology; it is dominated by plati-
tudes, stereotypes and ‘half-knowledge’ that serve the purpose of self-
reassurance, rather than contributing to the formation of the power of political
judgment; legitimate objections, compromises or alternative proposals of the
opposite side are unheard of. Democratic disputes and debate then become
not only unnecessary but also impossible. Instead of contributing to public
discourse and political awareness building through protest, it is far more likely
that the public will witness the escalation of the con!ict – without signi$cant
political results.
Protest and the ‘democratic experience’
My second objection is closely related to this criticism. It states that radical
democratic thinking has no theoretical grasp of what political protest – its
organization, its protest practices, the emotional and a#ective constitution
of activists and so on – owes to the ‘democratic experience’ (Lefort, 1986,
p. 20). Democracy is not just a regime but also a social form of life which is
shaped by democratic constitutionalism, the guarantee of fundamental
political rights, rule of law, the history of social movements and political
protest, etc. The new authoritarianism, populism and the democratic regres-
sion that accompanies it these days (Müller, 2016) and which has led to the
abolition of numerous legal guarantees and structures – such as the restruc-
turing of the legal system in Poland or Hungary, for example – show just
how fragile the pillars of democracy as a social form of life are. (My argu-
ment, however, should not be misunderstood as an apology of the status
quo, but is primarily committed to a thorough theorization of protest in
modern democracies.)
This lack of di#erentiation in radical democratic thinking becomes appar-
ent when one considers that law is only perceived as a limitation of creative
political action. Radical democrats tend to interpret law merely as an expres-
sion of hegemony and as means of domination.8 For example, Wolin argues
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that ‘a constitution in setting limits to politics sets limits as well to democ-
racy, constituting it in ways compatible with and legitimating of the domi-
nant power groups in the society’ (Wolin, 1994, p. 14). Due to this
perspective on law, radical democratic theorists argue for the ‘interruption
of order’ (Laclau, 1996, p. 62), plea for a ‘negative relationship to the laws of
the world’ (Badiou, 2008, p. 1878) or argue for the ‘necessity to suspend the
neutral space of Law’ (!i"ek, 2000, p. 222).
I consider this assessment of law and political order to be mistaken and
not convincing, for it does not take account of the enabling dimension of
every democratic constitutional order which cannot simply be identi$ed
with hegemony or ‘limitation’. Democratic constitutionalism consists of
two parts, the organization of political ruling and the consolidation of
domination on the one side but also the constitutionalization of critique
of domination and ruling on the other (see, Möller, 2015, p. 26). Marx
characterizes this tension as the ‘collision between the constitution and
the legislature’, as the ‘contradiction in the concept of the constitution’
(Marx, 1970 [1843]). Accordingly, one crucial feature of democratic law and
constitutional order is that it also preserves a durable and reliable political
context in which democratic-political struggle and dispute can happen,
occur and be experienced (Markell, 2006, p. 12).
In this sense, the law safeguards parts of the conditions that allow for
critique, protest and an active citizenry: it enables the ‘democratic experi-
ence’. One crucial aspect of this democratic experience is the knowledge
that protest in democracies does not necessarily need to be a great heroic
deed or a matter of life and death. This, however, is precisely what protest is
in dictatorships, authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes, which answer
protest with violence and terror. This may sound banal, but it is re!ected in
the whole organization of political protest. Accordingly, the establishment
of a protest camp on Tahir Square in Egypt under former President Mubarak
means something completely di#erent in every respect, as if activists were
building a camp on the Puerta del Sol in Madrid or in Zuccotti Park in
New York. In the $rst case, it is the instituting of democratic politics as such;
a revolutionary aura is immediately attached to the protest; the activists are
under extreme emotional pressure up to the point of fear of death. The
organization of the protest is a high-risk a#air that must be planned in
secret (see, e.g. Kricheli, Livne, & Magaloni, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). In
the second case, the protest movement exercises the right to freedom of
assembly. In modern democracies, demonstrations are usually even regis-
tered with administrative authority. However, spontaneous demonstrations
are also legal these days. Protest camps may also be set up and are often
covered by the right to freedom of assembly. The knowledge of the right to
protest as an element of a living democratic culture is also evident in the
very concrete practices of the activists (– which does not mean that there is
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no policing, obstruction or criminalization of protest. The opposite is true.).
The calls for demonstrations are public and not clandestine practices. The
corresponding groups and activists can meet without fear, network and plan
joint actions. Certainly, there is also a tendency in modern western democ-
racies to illegalize certain protest activities, to deny them the right to free-
dom of demonstration or to impose very strict restrictions on it, and to
police the protest. But still, in many modern democracies, living political
activism belongs to the essence of entire social milieus, not just the classical
leftist social milieu. Accordingly, at the end of the 1990s, Meyer and Tarrow
(1998) described modern Western society as a ‘social movement society’, in
which people, by means of protest, seek to change dominant normative and
cultural codes by gaining recognition for new identities (see, Polletta &
Jasper, 2001, p. 284). Some protests are sometimes colorful spectacles,
sometimes even carnivalesque events.
Michael Greven, therefore, speaks of the ‘possibility to politicize’ (Greven,
2010, p. 68), guaranteed in and by a democratic constitutional order as its
distinctive feature. The possibility to politicize is the other side of the coin of
a constitution in modern democracies, and it reveals the fact that
a democratic constitutional order can neither be simply identi$ed with
hegemony and the organization and consolidation of ruling nor is it plau-
sible to reduce law to its restrictive and imperative account. Rather, we also
need to acknowledge the enabling dimension of a democratic constitution
as conditio sine qua non for experiencing political action and vivid, post-
heroic protest. Within democracies, law also establishes a space in which
political con!icts can be expressed and dealt with, where con!ictive plurality
might appear. Some authors in line with key components of radical demo-
cratic thought may concede this, but they have yet failed to conceptually
grasp the enabling dimension of democratic constitutionalism and reconcile
it with their critical approach. As a result, there is the de$cit that this
thinking cannot perceive the di#erence between protests in and against
the political order of modern democracies on the one hand and protests
against authoritarian regimes on the other.
This lack of theoretical awareness and the widespread disregard of the
enabling character of democratic constitutionalism originate mainly in the
temporal bias on which radical democratic thinking is based. By temporal
bias, I mean that democracy and politics are reduced to one point in time, to
the fugitive, !eeting political moment of action, the ‘caesura’ (Abensour,
2010, p. 114). According to radical democratic thought, ‘true’ politics takes
place in the here and now, hic et nunc: ‘[T]he moment of intervention is the
moment of politics’ (Honig, 1991, p. 111). The disdain for the law, constitu-
tion and political order as the opposite of politics and democracy is closely
connected with this temporal bias, insofar as the disdain for the law is an
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17
expression of the disdain for the past, previous decisions and the previous
age as a normative reference point.
However, in modern democracies, many things are opposed to the
current moment. For example, the legal guarantees formulated in the
past. Or the moral-political responsibility toward the victims of one’s
national history of violence which might contradict the mood that currently
prevails in a country. The resulting con!ict is also a con!ict between
di#erent temporalities. And the free and democratic substance of a polity
is characterized precisely by the fact that it does not simply disregard these
di#erent temporalities for the sake of a single moment. Pierre Rosanvallon
therefore rightly speaks of the ‘pluralization of the temporalities of democ-
racy’ as a normative postulate (Rosanvallon, 2006, p. 206). In a democracy,
he states, ‘our time-consciousness needs to be vigilant in the case of
memory, lengthy in constitutionalism, variable for diverse institutions, and
short in opinion-formation; and all these have in turn to be mutually
adjusted’ (Rosanvallon, 2006, p. 207).
If we agree with the argument that di#erent temporalities collide with
each other in a democracy and that these di#erent temporalities must be
considered in a balanced manner, it soon becomes clear that the glori$ca-
tion of the moment of intervention and disruption as the sole and true
moment of democratic politics is less convincing – since it ignores the
complexities of the relation between time and politics in modern democ-
racies. Comprehensive theorization of the relationship between protest and
the democratic order that is yet to come must not ignore this complexity.
Conclusion
Radical democratic thought opens up new perspectives on interpreting non-
institutionalized collective practices of contestation in modern democracies. In
doing so, it re$nes the conceptual apparatus of democratic theory. One of its
central achievements has been to change the normative grid for the analysis of
confrontational, disruptive and riotous forms of protest in particular.
Especially during the heydays of deliberative democratic theory, these radical
forms of protest were considered normatively questionable political actions.
They were comprehensible perhaps from a sociological point of view, but
ultimately, they were not justi$able due to its ‘excessive’ and ‘disproportionate’
character. Radical democratic thought, instead, delivers a theoretical vocabulary
that allows us to interpret these practices of protest too as struggles for equality,
participation and an alternative account of the status quo, and to understand it
as a contribution toward the politicization of modern democracies.
At the same time, however, our analysis unfolds that radical democratic
thought does not come up with an answer as to where the limits of practices
of confrontation lie, and on which ground to distinguish between emancipatory
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forms of protest and non-emancipatory ones. This is just one of the reasons why
radical democratic thought is only partially well equipped to determine the
meaning of political protest in and for modern democracies. Another reason is
that radical democratic thought fails to reconcile the tension between the
organization of political domination and the constitutionalization of its critique
inherent to modern democratic constitutions. This tension, however, is not only
constitutive for modern democracies but also for any theoretical attempt to
determine the meaning of protest in it. In contrast to other political regimes,
a democratic order is based on abstract normative principles and ideals such as
equality, freedom, solidarity, justice, security, personal development, contingency
and alternativity of political decision-making as well as the right to dissent. To the
degree to which a democratic-constitutional order is based on these abstract
principles, it enters into promises that are meant to be realized within its frame-
work. It is a distinctive feature, therefore, of political protest in modern democ-
racies to reclaim these promises and to interpret these principles in new and
di#erent ways in the course of political con!ict and confrontation. A democratic
theory of political protest in modern democracies, still yet to be written, needs to
consider these complexities.
Notes
1. Some authors are very critical of the new forms of protest. Not only because
they believe them to be largely unpolitical spectacles (for G20, Gibson, 2008).
Rather, they have criticized the new protest movements such as Occupy or
Indignados for being purely situational and reactive, sticking merely to ‘nega-
tive politics’ (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 182).
2. For example, anti-austerity protest movements (Occupy, Indignados, etc.)
criticize the neoliberalization of modern democracies which is blamed for its
excluding and isolation triggering character which, in turn, should be over-
come on all levels of social life. For this reason, the activists not only estab-
lished a general assembly for matters of political organization but also
libraries, medical utilities, food supply, etc. according to the principle of
mutual assistance and collective self-management (Graeber, 2012, p. 31#).
3. One of many di#erences is the perception of populism. Whereas for Ernesto
Laclau (2005) populism is a form of construction of the political, which is
based on invoking the subalterns against those in power, Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri (2017, p.23) reject populism as being based on a conception of
leadership that disenfranchises the multitude.
4. In a similar way, Chantal Mou#e (2013) has criticized the Occupy movement as
naïve and as politically unsustainable activism, because it withdraws from any
institutionalized forms of politics and the forming of political alliances with
trade unions, parties, etc.
5. For a profound account of the Black Lives Matters movement against systema-
tic racial (police) violence, see Hooker (2016).
6. The counterpart would be a hyperrationalism, as represented by Rainer Forst,
and for whom ‘power is nouminal or intellectual in nature’ (Forst, 2017, p. 63).
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7. At the same time, with a view to violence at the G-20 summit in Hamburg, the
police violence must not go unmentioned; its martial appearance and the
dubious, ultimately failed strategy of tackling even minimal violations of
o"cial demonstration requirements by activists.
8. For an important exception, see Loick (2017).
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